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The Fourth Circuit Advances and Retreats on Shipowner's
Liability.
In three recent Fourth Circuit decisions, owners of vessels on
navigable waters of the United States received increased protection
from personal injury claims brought against them by longshoremen.
Pryor v. American President Lines' and Sacilotto v. National Ship-
ping Corp.' restricted the application of maritime law to claims by
longshoremen injured on land to situations in which the ship "proxi-
mately caused" the injury. In Bess v. Agromar Line,3 the court held
that the shipowner's duty to provide a reasonably safe place of work
to a longshoreman aboard ship was neither absolute nor nondelega-
ble. However, in another recent decision, Abbott v. United States
Lines,4 the Fourth Circuit expanded the duty of a vessel to rescue a
missing crewman by holding that the duty to search arises when the
ship's officers could reasonably have discovered the crewman mis-
sing.
A. The Applicability of Maritime Law in Personal Injury
Claims
An admiralty court's jurisdiction5 over personal injury claims was
traditionally limited to injuries occurring on navigable waters.' How-
520 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1976).
520 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1975).
3 518 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975).
512 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1975).
The Constitution provides: "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2. Congress imple-
mented the constitutional provision by giving the district courts original and exclusive
jurisdiction in any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1970).
1 Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Jensen marked the origin of the gangplank or locality rule
of admiralty jurisdiction. In Jensen, the widow of a longshoreman, who was killed on
the gangplank leading from ship to shore, was not allowed to recover under state
workmen's compensation because the gangplank was located over navigable water. Id.
at 217-18. Thus, the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction was drawn
where the gangplank touched the pier. In Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1
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ever, in the Admiralty Extension Act 7 of 1948, Congress expanded
that jurisdiction to injuries occurring on land. The Act established a
test which extended substantive maritime law to all claims by plain-
tiffs whose injuries, whether occurring on land or sea, were "caused"
by a vessel. In Pryor v. American President Lines8 and Sacilotto v.
National Shipping Corp.,' plaintiffs sought to invoke this extension
of federal maritime law to recover for shore injuries.
The fundamental issue in both Pryor and Sacilotto was whether
the vessels owned by the defendants had "caused" the plaintiffs'
injuries under the terms of the Extension Act. However, due to the
differences between the two cases in procedural setting, the resolution
of this substantive question had a different dispositive impact in each
case. In Sacilotto, an affirmative answer to the Extension Act test for
the applicability of maritime law was necessary to establish admi-
ralty jurisdiction."0 In Pryor, jurisdiction was based on diversity,' but
(1946), the Supreme Court specifically held the pier to be an extension of land and
not subject to admiralty jurisdiction under the locality rule. Id. at 7.
7 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that
such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
In any such case suit may be brought in rem or in personam
according to the principles of law and the rules of practice obtaining
in cases where the injury or damage has been done and consummated
on navigable water ....
Id.
Congress has the power to expand, contract, or alter the requirements for admi-
ralty jurisdiction. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959). The Admiralty Extension Act apparently falls within the proper bounds of that
power since the statute has survived constitutional attack in the lower federal courts
and was applied without question by the Supreme Court in Gutierrez v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963). See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 209-
10 (1971). See generally Garrett v. Gutzeit O/Y, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974).
8 520 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1976).
The plaintiff in Pryor was a longshoreman employed by an independent stevedoring
contractor to load defendant's vessel. Plaintiff was connecting the ship's winch to coils
of steel wire in a railroad gondola car on the dock, preparatory to the winch lifting the
coils aboard ship. When the top coil was lifted one of the coils underneath sprung open
and injured the plaintiff. Id. at 976.
9 520 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1975). The facts of Sacilotto closely parallel those in Pryor.
See note 8 supra. The plaintiff was in a railroad gondola car on the dock preparing
steel billets for loading aboard defendant's ship. When some top billets were lifted, one
of those underneath, which had been bowed by the weight of the lifted billets but had
not otherwise been touched, sprung and injured the plaintiff. Id. at 984.
11 It was necessary to establish jurisdiction in Sacilotto because the district court
had denied the plaintiff both diversity and admiralty jurisdiction. The plaintiff pur-
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the court still found it necessary to determine whether the Extension
Act test was met. Only if maritime law applied could the plaintiff
pursue recovery under the warranty of seaworthiness, a substantive
maritime cause of action." Hence, the essentially substantive ques-
tion, whether the ships caused the plaintiffs' injuries, was a ground
for jurisdiction and a basis to invoke a substantive maritime theory
of recovery."
In Pryor, 14 the court recognized only two possible theories of cau-
sation which could satisfy the Extension Act test. The first, or "ship's
winch" theory, was that the action of the ship's winch had "caused"
the coil which injured plaintiff to spring open. The second, or "ship's
cargo" theory, was that the defectively banded coil was "ship's
cargo" for which the vessel bore responsibility, thus imputing the
"cause" of plaintiff's injury to the ship. 5 The Fourth Circuit rejected
the ship's winch theory by upholding the district court's finding that
sued only the latter on appeal. 520 F.2d at 983-84.
1 Although in its unreported opinion the district court in Pryor found both diver-
sity and admiralty jurisdiction, the case proceeded on the admiralty side of the court.
520 F.2d at 976. Because the defendant, American President Lines, had admitted facts
that showed diversity in the lower court, the Fourth Circuit declined to consider the
propriety of the lower court's finding of admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 976-77. Consider-
ation of that issue was unnecessary because the "saving to suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1970) allows cases under maritime law to be brought in a non-admiralty federal
court if the separate jurisdictional requirements of that court are met.
11 The plaintiffs in both cases pursued seaworthiness claims as alternatives to any
they might have pursued in land-based law, since federal maritime law, once found to
apply, applies exclusively. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). In Pryor,
the plaintiff was already in court under diversity and could have asserted a land-based
negligence claim. However, the plaintiffs in the two cases sought the application of
maritime law and the warranty of seaworthiness probably because the warranty im-
putes liability to a shipowner for any injury caused by an unsafe condition of his vessel,
whether or not such condition resulted from his lack of care. See text accompanying
notes 38-50 infra.
11 A recent First Circuit case spoke of the double significance of a decision on the
applicability of maritime law. The court stated that ". . . the choice-of-law question
... whether the substantive principles applicable were those of maritime or state
law-necessarily implicates the jurisdictional issue presented here, since jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 is certainly no broader than the area in which maritime
principles are properly applied." Kinsella v. Zin Israel Navigation Co., 513 F.2d 701,
703 n.4 (1st Cir. 1975), citing Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 216 (1971).
1, Pryor v. American President Lines, 520 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1975). In Sacilotto,
the Fourth Circuit expressly adhered to the interpretation of the Admiralty Extension
Act which it adopted in Pryor. Sacilotto v. National Shipping Corp., 520 F.2d 983, 984-
85 (4th Cir. 1975). The discussion hereinafter, although based onPyor, will thus apply
equally to Sacilotto.
"1 520 F.2d at 978.
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the winch had been operated properly while loading the cargo."6 Thus,
since the court adopted a proximate cause construction of the Exten-
sion Act, 7 and the winch was only a "but for" cause of the plaintiffs
injury,'8 the plaintiff lost on this theory.
The Fourth Circuit supported a proximate cause construction of
the Extension Act with two Fifth Circuit cases, Kent v. Shell Oil Co.'"
and Adams v. Harris County. 0 These cases held maritime law inap-
plicable where the alleged injury-causing article, although part of or
appurtenant to the ship, was not the proximate cause of the plain-
tiffs' injuries.' Prior Fourth Circuit decisions,2 as well as those of the
" Id. at 976, 978.
,7 Id. at 979.
, Professor Prosser defines the "but for" rule as one which eliminates a defend-
ant's conduct as a cause of an event if the event would have occurred without such
conduct. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 41, at 238-39 (4th ed. 1971). If a "but for"
construction had been adopted in Pryor, "the action of the ship's winch in lifting
neighboring coils to allow the coil that injured [the plaintiff] to spring open would
[have invoked] maritime law." 520 F.2d at 978.
19 286 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1961). In Kent the plaintiff was injured while on the dock
loading pipes from a truck onto a barge. As he was readjusting the skids upon which
the pipes were rolled from the truck to the barge, one of the pipes rolled out of the
truck and struck him. The court found that "[n]othing the barge or tug did caused
the pipe to roll or move. Indeed, nothing about the skids or the fact that they may
have slipped or needed repositioning caused the pipe to roll." Id. at 750.
20 452 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1972). The plaintiff in Adams sued for injuries suffered
when he ran into the lowered barricade of a drawbridge. The bridge had been mistak-
enly raised to allow passage of a small pleasure boat. The boat was in the water by
right and had made no sign to the bridge operator to raise the bridge. Id. at 995.
21 In Kent, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected a "but for" interpretation of the
term "caused" in the Extension Act:
It might be argued that he would not have been in that position
were it not for the skids being used. But the cause of the injury in no
sense could be attributed to the vessel or its appurtenances. . . . The
extension of admiralty jurisdiction statute, 46 U.S.C.A. § 740, does
not therefore make a classic non-maritime, land-based injury into
something else.
286 F.2d at 750 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, the court in Adams stated:
The question, then is: Did the vessel cause the injuries to the
motorcyclist on the bridge? The vessel was simply approaching the
bridge, as any vessel in those waters had a right to do. There is no
showing that it was negligent in any respect. . . . The inescapable
conclusion is that the dropping of the barricade was solely the act of
the bridge keeper and no act of the vessel proximately caused his
negligence. ...
It inexorably follows that the injuries complained of were in no
way caused by a vessel on navigable water. Jurisdiction is not saved
by the Admiralty Extension Act.
It inexorable follows that the injuries complained of were in no
way caused by a vessel on navigable water. Jurisdiction is not saved
by the Admiralty Extension Act.
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Supreme Courtn and other circuits, 4 have unquestioningly applied
proximate cause.2 5 For example, in Tucker v. Calmar Steamship
Corp.,2 the Fourth Circuit held that, because the "proximate cause"
of plaintiffs injuries was the improper use of the ship's gear in load-
ing operations, maritime law applied to the shore injury.Y The court
applied a proximate cause test, but the decision provided no rule for
other cases in which proximate cause could not be found.2 Thus,
Pryor represents the first broadly applicable limitation on the term
"caused" in the Fourth Circuit.
Although the Pryor court did not expressly label the cause of
action arising from the ship's winch theory of causation, by implica-
tion both negligence and warranty of seaworthiness labels apply be-
cause the two Fifth Circuit cases requiring proximate cause pro-
ceeded on those theories. 2 This is especially significant for negligence
452 F.2d 996-97 (emphasis added).
' See Garrett v. Gutzeit O/Y, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974); Kloster v. S.S.
Chatham, 475 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1973); Snydor v. Villain & Fassio et Compania Interna-
zionale Di Genova Societa Reunite Di Naviagaione, S.P.A., 459 F.2d 365 (4th Cir.
1972), aff'g Green v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 71 (D. Md. 1971); Tucker v.
Calmar S.S. Corp., 457 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1972).
" See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971); Gutierrez v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
11 See Huser v. Santa Fe Pomeroy, Inc., 513 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1975); Thompson
v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964). See
also Di Paola v. International Terminal Operating Co., 294 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), remanded on other grounds, 418 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1969).
21 In none of these cases, however, did the parties offer any other causal theory.
See cases cited notes 22-24 supra.
26 457 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1972). The plaintiff was injured while loading pipe from
a railroad gondola car onto defendant's ship by a method that utilized the ship's winch.
He was struck by a pipe which slid out of the sling which was holding one end of the
pipes too high. Id. at 442-43.
" Id. at 442 n.1.
nSee, e.g., Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964), in which
a ship's winch and engines were used to bump a railroad car into place by the hatch
of the ship's hold, throwing the plaintiff, a longshoreman, from the car and severely
injuring him. Although the causation issue was not before the Third Circuit, it noted
language of the district court opinion which apparently distinguished the "but for" and
proximate cause theories. Id. at 660. The district court had stated that plaintiff's
position on the railroad car had not caused the accident; rather, it was the negligent
use of the vessel's winch and engines. Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 216 F. Supp.
234, 238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
In Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), the Supreme Court
applied maritime law because plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by defective
cargo containers appurtenant to the vessel, but did not say that proximate cause was
required in every case. Id. at 207.
23 See cases cited notes 19 and 20 supra. The plaintiff in Kent sought recovery in
1976]
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actions. If a "but for" causation test had been adopted, the negli-
gence theory applied in maritime law would have been different from
standard negligence. With the adoption of the proximate cause test,
however, the plaintiff in a maritime action must prove the same
elements as a plaintiff proceeding under land-based negligence
theory. Although the court's requirement of proximate cause in a
negligence claim was dictum," the decision might indicate how the
Fourth Circuit will rule when the question is actually presented.
3
1
The Fourth Circuit stated that requiring the plaintiff to prove
proximate cause will properly limit the expansion of federal maritime
jurisdiction into areas previously governed by state law.32 By confin-
ing cases under maritime law to those in which the injury on land was
proximately caused by a ship or its appurtenances, the Pryor court
precludes federal court decision in cases that meet only the broader
"but for" causation test. Thus, the holding in Pryor implements the
Supreme Court's policy against expansion of federal jurisdiction into
areas traditionally subject to state law.3
The finding, under the "ships cargo" theory of causation, that the
cargo of steel coils which injured the plaintiff had not become appur-
tenant to the ship also implements the policy of restricting federal
jurisdiction. 3 The Pryor court analyzed this theory of recovery as a
claim under the warranty of seaworthiness. 3 5 However, since the steel
coils had not come within the ship's control so that the vessel could
seaworthiness, 286 F.2d at 748, while the plaintiff in Adams sought damages through
a negligence claim, 452 F.2d at 995.
31 The question of negligence was not before the court in Pryor. The plaintiff had
given up that theory on appeal. 520 F.2d at 976.
31 The Pryor dictum may have particular importance in the future, because the
1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
removed the warranty of seaworthiness as a longshoreman's cause of action against a
vessel. Under the amendments, longshoremen may now proceed against vessels only
on negligence theory, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. III, 1973), amending 33 U.S.C. § 905
(1970). See note 37 infra.
32 520 F.2d at 980.
Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1971).
3' Pryor v. American President Lines, 520 F.2d 974, 982 & n.13 (4th Cir. 1975).
See text accompanying notes 32 and 33 supra.
33 The warranty of seaworthiness is founded on an absolute, nondelegable duty of
the shipowner to furnish a reasonably safe place to work. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Mahnich
v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). Due diligence by the shipowner will not
relieve him of liability if an unsafe condition of his vessel causes injury to a seaman,
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., id., to a longshoreman aboard ship, Seas Shipping Co.
v. Sieracki, supra, or to a longshoreman on the dock where the Admiralty Extension
Act applies, Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra.
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be held responsible for their defective condition, the plaintiff failed
to recover under the warranty." Despite recent congressional aboli-
tion of the warranty of seaworthiness for longshoremen,"7 this aspect
of Pryor retains much vitality.
The Fourth Circuit reached its decision on the ship's cargo theory
by adopting a test of appurtenancy as a prerequisite for longshore-
men's recovery under the warranty of seaworthiness." Traditionally,
the liability of a vessel for breach of the warranty attached without
proof of the ship's fault. 9 However, most cases brought under the
36 520 F.2d at 982.
7 The 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act withdrew from longshoremen a right of action against a vessel under the
warranty of seaworthiness. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. I1, 1973), amending 33 U.S.C.
§ 905 (1970). See note 31 supra. The 1972 amendments were not considered in the Pryor
and Sacilotto decisions, apparently because the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs oc-
curred prior to the amendments, which are not retroactively applied to injuries in-
curred before November 26, 1972, the effective date of the amending Act. See 118
CONG. REc. 36,384 (1972) (remarks of Mr. Burton and Mr. Quie). Cases will be decided
under the old Longshoremen's Compensation Act for a number of years, since maritime
tort claims, although subject to laches, are unrestricted by statutes of limitation. Watz
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 500 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1974).
Despite the abolition of the warranty of seaworthiness for longshoremen, the hold-
ings in Pryor and Sacilotto will be important under the 1972 amendments. A recent
case stated that § 905(b) does not disturb the jurisdiction of the admiralty court;
instead, it merely defines the rules of law to be applied once jurisdiction has been
established. Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G.,
387 F. Supp. 440, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1975). Thus the holdings of Pryor and Sacilotto will be applied to determine the
applicability of maritime law in negligence cases permitted under the 1972 amend-
ments. Moreover, one court suggested in dictum that § 905(b) of the amendments
eliminated seaworthiness liability only for suits by longshoremen. Lucas v. "Brinknes"
Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G., 387 F. Supp. 440, 442 n.6 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975). The language of the
amendments substantiates this. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. Im, 1973). Thus non-
longshoremen and non-seamen (seamen are covered by traditional maritime jurisdic-
tion and by the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970)) could bring seaworthiness actions
against a vessel using the Admiralty Extension Act to establish the applicability of
maritime law if the injury occurred on land.
Is 520 F.2d at 978 & n.3, citing Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206,
209-10 (1963). See text accompanying notes 43 and 45 infra.
' The warranty of seaworthiness is founded upon concern for the safety of the
seaman aboard ship. While at sea, a seaman is unable to escape an abuse of power by
his superior officers, such as their allowance of unsafe working conditions. If he aban-
dons the ship in port to escape such dangers, he may lose his pay and be subjected to
penalties for desertion. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1939).
The duty of a vessel to provide a safe place of work was extended to benefit the
longshoreman by Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Protection of the
longshoreman is evidently still an important goal today, since in the 1972 amendments
1976]
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warranty arose from injuries incurred on vessels. The Fourth Circuit
recognized this, and deduced that the no-fault liability under the
warranty existed only on the presumption that the vessel was the last
contributor to the injury-causing defect which the ship's owner could
have inspected and cured."0 Since the injury in Pryor occurred on
shore, the court reasoned that the vessel could not logically be respon-
sible under the seaworthiness theory unless the presumption was sat-
isfied.4' Thus, the Pryor court held that unless the ship exercised
some control over the coil, so that the defective article could be
considered appurtenant to the ship and the injury therefore attrib-
uted to the vessel, the plaintiff could not recover under the warranty.
Since the vessel's owner never had an opportunity to inspect, the
court determined that the ship never had sufficient control over the
cargo to make the defective steel coil an appurtenancy. Thus, the
doctrine of seaworthiness was held to apply only after cargo had first
come to rest on the ship's deck. Thereafter, the warranty could be
applied shoreward to an extent not remote in time or place.4"
In measuring the shoreward applicability of seaworthiness claims
by the test of appurtenancy, the Pryor court adhered to decisions of
the Supreme Court, its own previous decisions, and decisions of other
circuits.43 For example, in Garrett v. Gutzeit O/Y," the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that a shipowner is responsible for injuries caused by defec-
tive ship's cargo only after the ship has accepted the cargo. The
Supreme Court in Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp. adopted
a similar rule. 5 These cases are consistent with Pryor in that the
to the Longshoremen's Compensation Act, Congress increased the benefits payable to
longshoremen under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. 11, 1973), amending 33 U.S.C. §
906 (1970). See H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted at 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698.
520 F.2d at 981.
4' Id. at 982.
42 Id.
11 See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971); Gutierrez v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Garrett v. Gutzeit OY, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974);
Huser v. Santa Fe Pomeroy, Inc., 513 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1975). Contra, Gebhard v.
S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970). See generally Snydor v. Villain
& Fassio et Compania Internazionale Di Genova Societa Reunite Di Naviagaione,
S.P.A., 459 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'g Green v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 328 F. Supp.
71 (D. Md. 1971); Kinsella v. Zin Israel Navigation Co., 513 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1975);
Mascuilli v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Pa.
1974), affd, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1975).
" 491 F.2d 228, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1974).
45 373 U.S. 206 (1963). The Court stated: "When the shipowner accepts cargo in
a faulty container or allows the container to become faulty, he assumes the responsibil-
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coverage of the warranty of seaworthiness begins when the ship takes
the cargo aboard and applies thereafter until the ship relinquishes
control. Although the Fourth Circuit specified no linear measurement
of the inland extension of maritime law,"6 the test of appurtenancy
should identify the limit according to the facts of each case." Pryor
is significant because the court marries the test of appurtenancy to
its proximate cause interpretation of the Admiralty Extension Act.
The Act expressly requires that the injury to the plaintiff be caused
by a ship." Since a claim in unseaworthiness is for injury caused by
an unsafe condition of the ship or its appurtenance, that condition
must be linked to the ship in order to satisfy the terms of the Act.49
Thus, the court in Pryor devised the control requirement to link the
injury-causing instrument to the vessel. Only if the link was satisfac-
torily proved could the ship logically be deemed the proximate cause
of the injury under the warranty."
The dual cause factual setting of Pryor presented an opportunity
for the Fourth Circuit to hold that the "caused by a ship" language
of the Admiralty Extension Act meant proximate cause. Unlike pre-
vious cases in which proximate cause was present and thus not a
ity for injury that this may cause to seamen or their substitutes on or about the ship."
Id. at 213-14. In Gutierrez, the plaintiff was injured when he slipped on beans which
had spilled from defective bags just unloaded from the defendant's ship. Id. at 207.
The Court held that the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, including cargo containers,
applies to longshoremen unloading the ship whether they are working on the pier or
on the vessel. Id. at 215.
,1 The Pryor court in fact expressly declined to set linear boundaries on the inland
extension of maritime law. 520 F.2d at 982.
,1 The Pryor court explained the control requirement as allowing, in a case where
the original cause of the defective condition is unknown, liability under the warranty
to be imputed to the last person in command of the defective article. Id. at 981. The
warranty would thus apply inland to the extent control of the defective good was not
clearly exercised by someone other than the vessel.
46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). For the text of § 740, see note 7 supra.
,I The Pryor court labelled the ship's cargo theory as a claim in unseaworthiness.
Clearly the Fourth Circuit treated the theory as such a claim, because only under
seaworthiness does the issue of whether the injury-causing instrument is a part or
appurtenance of the ship arise. The Supreme Court recently distinguished claims
under the seaworthiness warranty from negligence claims by recognizing that the for-
mer are founded on defective conditions of the ship or its appurtenances, while the
latter are based upon the acts or omissions of the shipowner or crewmen themselves.
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971). See Gutierrez v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
11 The Fourth Circuit stated in Pryor: "[wie think the no-fault doctrine of unsea-
worthiness is inapplicable on the facts of this case. For a ship to be responsible for
injuries shoreward of the gangplank we think it must proximately cause injury to those
ashore." 520 F.2d at 982.
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dispositive issue, its absence in Pryor enabled the court to make it
such an issue. The decision in Sacilotto v. National Shipping Corp.,"'
which was controlled by Pryor, permitted the court specifically to
support the proximate cause rule in a purely jurisdictional setting.
Although these cases have effected no actual change in the law of
seaworthiness as applied to claims by longshoremen injured on shore,
they do solidify existing practice. Additionally, the dictum in Pryor
requiring proximate cause in a negligence claim brought under the
Act is consistent with current policy requiring that land-based negli-
gence principles apply to personal injury claims of longshoremen.52
B. Shipowner's Duty of Care
Prior to 1972 a longshoreman could maintain an action against a
vessel under the warranty of seaworthiness.53 A recent amendment to
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act54 ex-
pressly abolished this theory of recovery for persons subject to the
Act, but § 905(b) reserved the right of a longshoreman to sue the
vessel in negligence.5 However, the amended Act left some question
concerning the degree of a shipowner's duty of care, the breach of
which would give rise to an injured plaintiff's recovery under §
905(b). In Bess v. Agromar Line,5" the problem of identifying what
duties of care shipowners owed longshoremen under the amended Act
arose in the Fourth Circuit.
The plaintiff in Bess asserted that his injuries resulted from the
51 520 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1975). For the facts of Sacilotto, see note 9 supra. In
Sacilotto, as in Pryor, the test of appurtenancy was not met because the shipowner
had had no opportunity to control the injury-causing instrument. The defendant
shipowner in Sacilotto had no chance to inspect the steel billets because they had not
been loaded aboard defendant's vessel, and thus were not ship's cargo. 520 F.2d at 984-
85.
" See text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
13 See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
" 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. III, 1973), amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970).
55 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. II, 1973) provides in pertinent part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter
caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an
action against such vessel as a third party . . . . The liability of the
vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of
seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The
remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other
remedies available under this chapter.
Id.
56 518 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975).
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defendant shipowner's breach of a nondelegable duty to provide a
safe place of work." After examining prior law,5" the Fourth Circuit
found that this duty traditionally arose under the warranty of seawor-
thiness." However, since the 1972 amendments to the
Longshoremen's Compensation Act expressly abolished liability to
longshoremen under the seaworthiness theory, the court concluded
that the duty to provide a safe place to work had been abolished as
well, at least as it had applied in a seaworthiness claim." Neverthe-
less, the Bess court considered whether a nondelegable duty to pro-
vide a safe place of work might also inhere in the negligence action
preserved by the amended Act."
While the Fourth Circuit resolved that the defendant's asserted
duty did not so inhere,62 it left unresolved the question of the standard
of care required of a shipowner under the Act. A decision on that
question was unnecessary 3 because the legislative history of the
Longshoremen's Compensation Act expressly ruled out the plaintiffs
assertion.64 The Bess court stated that the provisions of the House
1 Id. at 740. Bess and his work partner were loading bales of paper pulp in the
hold of defendant's vessel. Because both the bales and the ship's hold were of irregular
shape, gaps remained between the stacked bales. Bess stepped into one of these gaps
while attempting to lift a bale onto the third tier of the bales already stacked, and fell
with the five hundred pound bale on top of him. Plaintiff had previously asked the
"hatch tender" for plywood dunnage-sheets of plywood typically used in loading
operations in a ship's hold to separate cargo and provide a uniform working surface-to
lay over the tiers, but none had been supplied. Both plaintiff and the hatch tender were
employees of an independent stevedoring contractor who supplied longshoremen to
load the defendant's vessel. Id. at 739-40.
5, Id. at 740-41. The court cited Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab,
399 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1968), and Boleski v. American Export Lines, Inc., 385 F.2d 69
(4th Cir. 1967). Both of these cases followed Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S.
539 (1960), which held the shipowner's duty to provide a reasonably safe place of work
to be nondelegable and absolute. The Supreme Court held that this duty did not
require an accident-free ship, but one reasonably fit for its intended use. Id. at 550.
See Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc., 324 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1963); Frasca v.
Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975). See also note 35 supra.
' See note 35 supra.
518 F.2d at 740-41.
Id.
62 Id. at 742.
But see Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md.
1975), in which a district court took an alternate route to its holding that the nondeleg-
able and absolute duty of seaworthiness had been eliminated by the 1972 amendments.
The court found that Congress had intended to adopt land-based negligence law in the
amendments. Recognizing that the negligence duty conflicted with that of seaworthi-
ness, the court held the latter duty inapplicable. Id. at 1098.
11 H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1972), reprinted at 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4703-04, quoted, 518 F.2d at 741.
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Committee Report illustrated the intent of Congress, in passing the
1972 amendments, to abolish both the seaworthiness warranty and its
underlying duty irrespective of the label given that duty.6" Moreover,
Congress placed a more limited substantive duty on all vessels by
stating that a shipowner has the responsibility to correct dangerous
conditions of which he knows or should know."6 In dictum, Bess found
the defendant without knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
unsafe condition in the hold of the ship, and therefore not bound to
take corrective action under the limited duty suggested by the legisla-
tive history. 7 Thus, by construing congressional intent, the court
rejected the plaintiff's assertion and approved the defendant
shipowner's conduct, but was not required to determine the breadth
of the duty of care required under the amended Act. 8
The plaintiff in Bess also sought recovery under traditional negli-
gence theories. First, Bess asserted that the shipowner had a duty to
provide plywood dunnage to insure safe work conditions, and that
defendant's breach of this duty contributed to the unsafe condition
which proximately caused his injury. 9 Second, plaintiff contended
that defendant had this duty as a matter of law because the need for
Id. at 742. The Committee Report stated:
The Committee also rejected the thesis that a vessel should be
liable without regard to its fault for injuries sustained by employees
covered under this Act while working on board the vessel. Vessels have
been held to what amounts to such absolute liability by decisions of
the Supreme Court . . . which held that the traditional seamen's
remedy based on the breach of the vessel's absolute, nondelegable
duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was also available to longshoremen
The Committee believes that . . . there is no compelling reason
to continue to require vessels to assume what amounts to absolute
liability for injuries which occur to longshoremen and other workers
covered under the Act who are injured while working on those vessels.
H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1972), reprinted at 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4698, 4702-03.
6 The report stated the duty as follows: "[N]othing in this bill is intended to
derogate from the vessel's responsibility to take appropriate corrective action where it
knows or should have known about a dangerous condition." H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972), reprinted at 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4704.
67 518 F.2d at 741-42.
" Congress intended land-based negligence law to supply the duty of care required
under the 1972 amendments. See Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644 (N.D.
Cal. 1974); Citizen v. MIV Triton, 384 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Fedison v. Vessel
Wislica, 382 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1974). See also text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
11 518 F.2d at 742. See note 57 supra.
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dunnage was foreseeable. 0 Because these theories were based on tra-
ditional negligence principles, the Fourth Circuit found them clearly
cognizable under the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Com-
pensation Act.7' However, the court held against Bess because he had
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant was
under any duty to provide dunnage.
7 2
Although the Bess court must have found that the defendant
shipowner owed Bess a duty of reasonable care in order to test the
sufficiency of plaintiffs evidence, it neglected to state the basis for
the duty. Pursuant to the legislative history of the 1972 amend-
ments, 3 cases under the amended Act have looked to land-based
negligence principles for the source of the duty of care.7' These cases
70 518 F.2d at 742.
71 Id.
n1 Apparently, Bess failed to offer proof sufficient to meet his burden of going
forward with the evidence. Professor Prosser suggests that the term "duty" should be
limited to the legal obligation of reasonable conduct of one party to another which
arises because of their relationship. He explains that often courts will apply "duty"
terminology to what is really only a standard of conduct necessary to satisfy a duty
already established. W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRrS § 53 (4th ed. 1971). This is apparently
what the Bess court did when it stated that the plaintiff failed to prove with sufficient
evidence a duty on defendant to provide dunnage. Had this been the actual duty under
the negligence cause of action, as Prosser recommends the term be used, the plaintiff
could have recovered because the defendant did not supply dunnage. Since Bess did
not recover, the court must have used the term to signify a standard of conduct the
breach of which plaintiff failed to prove. Because the court refers to plaintiff as the
employee of an independent stevedoring contractor, the duty which the court adopted
was probably that due a business invitee under land-based negligence. However, in no
other way does the Fourth Circuit indicate what duty it used. See text accompanying
note 75 infra.
n The House Committee Report stated:
The Committee believes that where a longshoreman or other worker
covered under this Act is injured through the fault of the vessel, the
vessel should be liable for damages as a third party, just as land-based
third parties in non-maritime pursuits are liable for damages when,
through their fault, a worker is injured.
H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Seass. 4 (1972), reprinted at 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4698, 4702.
U, See Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975);
Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama, 391 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Md. 1975);
Birrer v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 386 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Ore. 1974); Ramirez
v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Citizen v. M/V Triton, 384 F.
Supp. 198 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222 (E.D.
Tex. 1974); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G.,
379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In Anuszewski the court stated:
[The legislative history] speaks clearly for itself, and establishes that
land-based principles of law apply to longshoremen's claims for dam-
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have analogized factual situations similar to Bess to the relationship,
in land-based negligence law, between the owner of premises and his
business invitee. 5 Arguably, Bess followed this line of reasoning;6
however, the court failed to state that the duty it applied arose from
the plaintiff's relationship as a business invitee of the defendant. In
leaving the breadth of the duty of care required under the amended
Act thus undefined, Bess does not clarify the law.
C. The Duty of a Ship to Rescue
The duty of a ship at sea to undertake the rescue of a crewman
who had fallen overboard depended traditionally on whether there
was a reasonable possibility of rescue.7 7 The rescue duty derived from
the relationship between the ship's officers and the members of the
crew. Because the crewmen were in a subordinate position, the law
implied in the contract of employment a duty on the ship to under-
take every reasonable effort to rescue a missing crewman.7 8 Under
prior law, the duty arose when the crewman was discovered to be
missing.7" In Abbott v. United States Lines, Inc.,"5 however, the
ages against third parties and that a ship has no different liability to
longshoremen employed to work aboard it by a stevedoring company
than the owner of a land-based property owes to the employees of an
independent contractor who perform work on that property.
391 F. Supp. at 1146.
11 See Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975),
in which, drawing an analogy to land-based tort law, the court found the plaintiff in
the position of a business invitee. On that basis the shipowner must protect the invitee
from unreasonable defects which he could have discovered with reasonable care, and
which he should have realized were dangerous with respect to the invitee. However, if
the shipowner may reasonably expect the invitee to discover the harm and protect
himself against it, then there is no duty. The Frasca court found the danger to be of
this latter type, and since the longshoremen had control of the loading procedure, the
shipowner had reason to expect them to remedy any dangerous situation. Id. at 1102.
76 See note 72 supra.
" Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
"' Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931). See Cortes v. Balti-
more Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932). The Court in Cortes stated: "Out of this
relation of dependence and submission there emerges for the stronger party a corre-
sponding standard or obligation of fostering protection." Id. at 377.
11 Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 333 U.S. 821 (1948). Anderson was an
action filed under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 51 et seq. (1970),
to recover for the death of an employee of the defendant Railway Company. Neverthe-
less, it is relevant authority for a maritime duty of rescue since the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 688 (1970), under which the plaintiff in Abbott filed suit, provides that ". . . all
statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in
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Fourth Circuit extended the duty of rescue by adopting a reasonable
care test to determine when the ship's officers should have known
that a crewman was missing.8 '
The specific issue facing the court in Abbott was whether the
defendant shipowner had negligently breached his duty to rescue by
not discovering the deceased crewman's absence sooner, thereby
causing his death. 2 The Fourth Circuit held that "if there is a reason-
able possibility of rescue, a ship is under a duty to search and attempt
a rescue when its officers know or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known that a crewman is missing.
'83
In Abbott, the lower court relied upon Gardner v. National Bulk
Carriers, Inc.,"4 an earlier Fourth Circuit case, in holding that the
duty to rescue did not arise until the crewman was known to be
missing.' However, in Gardner the ship had been fully searched with-
out finding the deceased, and the court concluded that the ship had
a duty to search the waters where the ship might have been when the
deceased fell overboard. 8 In reversing, the Fourth Circuit in Abbott
did not alter the duty to rescue a crewman who was known to be
missing. However, relying upon general negligence principles, the
Fourth Circuit extended the duty to include a requirement of reason-
able care to discover initially that a crewman is missing."7
Nevertheless, the reasoning behind the decision in Gardner" sup-
ports the result in Abbott, and illustrates a policy which may be used
in future cases. The crewman in Gardner had been missing for an
indefinite period of time, but the court held that rescue must be
the case of railway employees shall be applicable." 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
512 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 121.
Plaintiff sued under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), and the Death on
the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970), for the death of her husband when he
apparently fell overboard from defendant's ship, of which he was chief engineer. At
about 5:00 a.m. on the day of his death, the deceased was summoned to the engine
room due to engine problems necessitating the shutting down of the engines. When
called, he replied he would come down. The problem was quickly cured before the
deceased arrived; however, deceased was not notified. At 8:00 a.m. it was discovered
that deceased had not been in his cabin since shortly after he had originally been
called. The ship was searched and then returned to where it had been at 5:00 a.m.,
but deceased was not found. 512 F.2d at 119-20.
10 Id. at 119 (emphasis in original).
" 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
512 F.2d at 120.
310 F.2d at 288.
512 F.2d at 121. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for a new trial. Id.
' Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
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